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LIMITS TO STATE CONTROL OF PRIVATE

BUSINESS.

IT was a new departure in government when the people of

the American States planted their institutions on funda-

mental principles which embodied a distrust of their own rep-

resentatives. Distrust of irresponsible power may indeed be

accepted as one of the conditions of liberty; and from the days

of King John there had been no want of it among English-

speaking people. Representative institutions had grown out

of it, and these had taken such root and expanded with such

vigor that their branches at length overshadowed all else, and

liberty was supposed to be secure in proportion as the repre-

sentatives of the people were powerful. All this time, how-

ever, distrust had the crown for its object, not the legislature;

and while it was not doubted that hasty or extravagant action

on the part of the legislature was possible, the restraining influ-

ence of the two houses on each other, and the undefined checks

which the kingly authority might in certain ways impose, were

supposed to be ample to protect against serious evils. With

the crown under due restraint, the people felt no alarm: it

might be said that the sovereignty was still in them, and that

the legislature held by delegation a trust only; but it was,

nevertheless, a trust conferred in such boundless confidence,

that the beneficiaries were content to retain, in respect to it,

only such ultimate control as is implied in the right of revolu-

tion. The theoretical compact of government between the

people on the one hand and their rulers on the other, though
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supposed to be conditioned on a just exercise of the powers con-

ferred, was really one under which the only means of enforcing

16
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the condition must be such as an oppressed people might find

in the implements of war. But what need of any condition

whatever when those to be protected were the very persons

delegating the trust, and who selected the recipients from their

own number, limiting the delegation to a brief period, at the

end of which time they were at liberty to recall and dismiss in

disgrace the agent whd proved unfaithful?

The American people, however, even for the brief period of

a representative's term, conferred no unlimited authority. From

the first, they separated the judicial from the law-making au-

thority, and in creating a legislative department they made it

the depository of a special trust, in the execution of which it

was to act as a special agent only. In the new fabric of gov-

ernment, legislative omnipotence was no more allowed a place

than was executive irresponsibility; and for the period, however

brief, of representative authority, the delegated function must

be exercised within limits previously defined, and subject to

which the delegation had been made. If, therefore, in Eng-

land, the representative for the time being might be said to

hold a general letter of attorney, the American, on the other

hand, held a special and limited authority: with the former, the

act done would stand as its own justification; the latter, at the

peril of having whatever he might do disregarded and annulled,

must keep within the letter of his warrant.

It must be conceded, nevertheless, that in the original estab-

lishment of American constitutions no special distrust of legis-
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lative bodies was manifested. On the contrary, these bodies

were from the first the chief depositaries of power, and the re-

straints imposed resulted as a consequence of a written charter

of government and of the division of power under it, instead of

having been an object in view in creating the government. Leg-

islative powers were granted by the first American constitutions

in very general terms, and the doctrine that the representative

was subject to any other than a political responsibility, or that

legislative acts might be questioned elsewhere, did not readily

take root in American soil. It was the judges, not the legisla-

ture, who first became subject to popular mistrust, and those

who first refused to obey an unconstitutional law were pro-

ceeded against as offenders. Disregard of legislative action
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seemed to popular apprehension an affront to the people, and

was punished accordingly.

But the country was not slow to discover the need of some

other check upon representatives than that which was afforded in

frequent elections. The Yazoo grant of 1795, in Georgia, brought

about by fraud and deception, was so enormous in magnitude

and interested so many persons, that it attracted the attention

of the whole country, and presented inclear light the possibility

that fraud might infect the whole legislative body, and that

corrupt inducements might incline the representative to con-

nive at or assist in the robbery of his constituents. From that

time to the present, the number of constitutional restrictions

imposed for the express purpose of keeping the law-making de-

partment in close restraint within prescribed limits and under

prescribed forms of action, have been steadily increasing in num-

ber, until in some States the presumption that the legislature

possesses a general power to make laws in its discretion has

almost passed away. The general power has now so many limita-

tions, and must be exercised under such carefully prescribed con-

ditions, that the experienced legislator is excusable if he some-

times stumbles into difficulties, and finds to his surprise that

something in his legislation'will not bear the test of all the rules

that have been prescribed for his observance. To prove this,

let the reader examine almost any of the new or recently re-

vised constitutions. An inspection will show the following

state of things: First, That a number of subjects are removed
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altogether from legislative cognizance. Second, That upon a

still larger number of subjects the legislature is forbidden to

act, except by general law. Third, That when acting upon any

subject, certain set forms must be observed, which are imposed

for the purpose of forcing upon the legislature a care, caution,

and deliberation not otherwise likely to be secured. These

forms are thus made a condition to valid legislation, and the

necessity of observing them is imperative. The principal of

these are, that each act shall embrace but a single object, which

shall be expressed in its title; that the bill shall have several

readings on different days, and shall be passed only on a re-

corded vote by yeas and nays. Peculiar provisions are made in

some States which are even more stringent.
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It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that con-

stitutional restraints have really narrowed the field actually

occupied by legislation. On the contrary, excepting a few years

immediately following the Peace of 1783, when the terrible op-

pression of public and private debt impelled to public disorder,

and led to the legislative abuses usually accompanying the acts

making paper a legal tender in the payment of debts, the early

legislation was in general more careful, more circumspect, and

less open to criticism as encroaching on private rights or sound

principles, than much of that more recent. In late years the

channel of legislation has been narrowed, but the stream has

risen in proportion, and by far the larger part of all the doubt-

ful legislation which the history of the country presents has

taken place since the year 1846, when radical ideas began to be

characteristic of State constitutions, and the theory that officers

of every department should be made as directly as possible

responsible to the people after short terms of service was ac-

cepted as a political maxim. The one may not be a conse-

quence of the other, but the times have invited legislative

experiments, and the invitation has been freely accepted.

Evidences of this may be found in abundance. The legis-

lation in aid of private individuals and corporations would first

attract attention, not only because of its magnitude, but because

around it has clustered much that was questionable, and not a

little that proved to be corrupt. The grants made for these

purposes within the last thirty years have been of all sorts and
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under all pretences, and compared with some of them the

Yazoo grant sinks into insignificance. They were made by the

nation and by the States; and majorities of local communities

were permitted to assume burdens, not for themselves merely,

but also for the non-assenting minorities, to purchase stock in

business enterprises. On all hands it will be conceded that

this legislation pressed hard upon the implied limits of legisla-

tive power; but the reasons favoring it were always plausible,

because the nominal purpose in view was always one in which

the community was more or less concerned. This was particu-

larly the case when the assistance was given to railroad enter-

prises; and it was often asserted by the projectors that rail-

roads were public highways, and assistance was demanded on
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that ground. The evils that have resulted from such legislation,

equally with the incidental benefits, are foreign to the present

discussion, but the grants themselves and the ground on which

they have been made may have some bearing. Questionable

legislation can never stand by itself: if it is accepted, whatever

is within the principle underlying it must be accepted also, and

so must all that necessarily pertains and is incidental to it.

The present purpose is to inquire whether, in the matter of

the regulation of property rights and of business, legislation has

not of late been occupying doubtful, possibly unconstitu-

tional grounds. The discussion in the main must be limited

to fundamentalprinciples, aided by such light as legal and con-

stitutional history may throw upon them, since the express

provisions of the constitutions can give little assistance. They

always contain the general guaranty of due process of law to

life, liberty, and property, but in other particulars they for the

most part leave protection to principles which have come from

the common law. And what is due process of law can never

be settled as an abstract question: it has a new phase with

every new case, and judicial history shows that judges differ

concerning it at the present day when peculiar cases arise, as

radically as they did when ship-money was in question, and

when the king's warrant was supposed by some to be sufficient

justification for an arrest, though it specified no cause.

The general right of the state to prescribe rules for the

regulation of property and business is so plain, that no one dis-
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putes it. The right is a necessary one in government: a man

could securely have nothing and safely enjoy nothing if the

limits of interference by others were not prescribed by law.

The laws of property are in themselves regulations, and the

rules which give remedies for the invasion of rights are what

render civilization and orderly society possible. Bentham, in

his Principles of the Civil Code, has expressed this with great

force and clearness. "Law," he says, "has accomplished what

all the natural feelings were not able to do; law alone has

been able to create a fixed and durable possession which de-

serves the name of property. The law alone could accustom

men to submit to the yoke of foresight, at first painful to be

borne, but afterwards agreeable and mild; it alone could encour-
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age them rin labor, superfluous at present, and which they are

not to enjoy till the future. Economy has as many enemies as

there are spendthrifts, or men who would enjoy without taking

the trouble to produce. Labor is too painful for idleness, it is

too slow for impatience, cunning and injustice underhandly

conspire to appropriate its fruits ; insolence and audacity plot

to seize them by open force. Hence security, always tottering,

always threatened, never at rest, lives in the midst of snares.

It requires in the legislator vigilance continually sustained and

power always in action to defend it against his constantly reviv-

ing crowd of adversaries. The law does not say to a man,

I 'Work, and I will reward you,' but it says to him,' Work, and by

stopping the hand that would take them from you, I will insure

you the fruits of your labor, its natural and sufficient reward,

which without me you could not preserve.' If industry creates,

it is the law which preserves; if at the first moment we owe

every thing to labor, at the second and every succeeding

moment we owe every thing to the law."

This is a strong statement, but it is literally true and exact.

Every man's rights are necessarily relative, and they are meas-

ured by means of the limits which are set to the rights of

others. It is vain to say, except in the most general and pop-

ular sense, that every man has supreme dominion within the

boundaries of his own freehold; for his lands are not only

charged with servitudes for the benefit of his neighbor, but his

management of his lands is restrained in various ways by rules
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prescribed for the benefit of others. Whatever he does upon

his premises' that would be offensive to his neighbor, and that

the laws of good neighborhood would not sanction or excuse,

may render him liable to prosecution for creating a nuisance.

His lawful calling he is entitled to pursue at discretion, but if

the calling he has chosen be one whose tendency is to disturb

the peace or destroy the comfort of the immediate neighbor-

hood, he might be driven from any thickly settled district as a

malefactor if he should attempt to establish it there; and the

importance and usefulness of his trade would not protect him.

The state leaves the rites of sepulture and the manner of dis-

posing of the bodies of the dead to the affections and the sense

of propriety and decency of surviving friends, but not wholly
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without supervision; for if these were to import into any Chris-

tian state the custom of some savage tribes of exposing their

dead on scaffolds to foul birds of prey, the law would assuredly

visit them with condemnation and punishment. Indeed, every

item of individual property, real or personal, every kind of busi-

ness, every movement of the living person where he may come

in contact with others, the conduct of the living and the dis-

posal of the dead, are all brought within the control of regula-

tions established by the state, or by customs which the state

adopts, and which thus become its regulations. Men cannot

escape from these if they would, and they would fall back into

a state of savagery if they could and did.

But while this is asserted in very positive terms, it is affirmed

with equal positiveness ^iat there ought to be and are some

limits to the right to establish such regulations. An unlimited

power in the state to control and regulate private property and

private business would make freedom and content as precarious

as would an unlimited power in every individual to interfere at

will in the concerns of his neighbor. The latter would arm

every man against his neighbor; the former would be liable at

any time to direct with crushing force the power of the state

against any interest which for the time had the popular feeling

arrayed against it. To-day the unpopular interest may be the

professional or mercantile class, to-morrow it may be corpora-

tions, and the day following the laborers upon railroads or in

mines. Security can only be found in general principles, and
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the same general principle that will protect one must protect

all. If any general principle can be put aside in order that the

state may reach one interest, it may also be put aside when any

other interest seeks its protection. Constitutional law can know

no favoritism; if principles are not fixed and permanent they

are not constitutional, and may be suspended or overridden to

suit the passion or caprice of the moment. And as security

and content can only repose in settled principles, the question

of the relative advantage of republican and autocratic institu-

tions will be very much narrowed if it be conceded that the

state may exercise in respect to private property and private

business the powers an autocrat assumes. Indeed, it may al-

most be said to be narrowed to this: Whether many persons,
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having the powers of sovereignty intrusted to them for exercise,

would probably exercise them with more wisdom, discretion,

impartiality, and justice than would a single person with similar

powers. Upon such a question the most ardent republican

might well hesitate before expressing a definite opinion ; for the

advantages of government are not to be found in its forms

exclusively: they must be perceived also in its results.

That there are some limits to state interference will proba-

bly be denied by no one. Those who go farthest in the direc-

tion of what is sometimes called paternal government by state

or nation would claim some exemptions on their own behalf,

and would be compelled to concede some to others. What

the limits are and how they are to be found, is the question.

Where they are not prescribed by the constitution of a state,

probably it will be said they must be sought in the common law

and in the constitutional history of the people. This is the

common and necessary resort when questions arise concerning

the proper functions of government.

But if you assume that the government may do whatever it

may find precedents for in constitutional history, you assume

the existence of a practical legislative omnipotence, restrained

only as limitations are expressly imposed. Taking as a strong

illustration the matter of regulating prices, and you may easily

prove in this way that the legislative power is ample. Edward

II. regulated prices by proclamation in 1314, and whoever re-

fused to sell ox, sheep, hog, goose, pigeon, or egg at the price
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he named forfeited it to the king. Edward III. followed the

example by proclamation in 1330, and afterwards by statute. In

the time of Henry IV. the price at which foreign corn was per-

mitted to be sold in the realm was prescribed by law for the

benefit of the farmers; and Henry VIII., on the other hand, for

the benefit of those who purchased from the farmers, limited

by law the prices of their beef, pork, and mutton, thereby hold-

ing them under the like restraint to that which he imposed

upon importers of wines. The rates of wages were perhaps

oftener limited by law than the prices of wares, and the method

of regulation was specially objectionable, in its being generally

left to the local authorities, who would be interested, if at all,

in keeping the wages low; but this method was continued
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down to the time of the American Revolution. Elizabeth

thought public policy demanded of her that she should pre-

scribe the size of lot a man might build his cottage upon; and

she did so, following the example of her father, who restricted

the number of sheep a farmer might keep, and of her grand-

father, who limited the number of acres a single farmer might

cultivate. For sumptuary laws there are not only precedents,

but reasons even in recent times. Montesquieu thought them

important in republics, and John Adams in 1778 had some

words of regret because he thought the people would not

endure them. They were almost as frequent in English history

as laws to prevent extortionate prices. By turns Parliament pre-

scribed the length of a man's shoe and the cut of his coat; it

sometimes forbade his indulging in the extravagance of foreign

cloths, and sometimes limited the courses at his table. Mon-

tesquieu said that in Venice the people were compelled by the

laws to moderation. "They are so habituated to parsimony

that none but courtesans can make them part with their money.

Such is the method made use of for the support of industry;

the most contemptible of women may be profuse without

danger, whilst those who contribute to their extravagance con-

sume their days in the greatest obscurity." It is not without

curious interest in this connection that when the Parliament of

James VI. of Scotland undertook to put down extravagance in

dress among women, and to limit their expenditures for that pur-

pose to what they could afford, they enacted "that it be lauch-
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full to na wemen to weir abone their estait except" this same

shameless class. Doubtless the purpose was to make female

extravagance disreputable, by branding it as an advertisement

of shame. But James, though he humorously indorsed upon

it, "This act is verray gude," had the sense also to add his

veto. Notwithstanding this, James, when he came to the

throne of England, thought proper to prescribe the quantity of

ale which should be sold for a penny, as the Lord Mayor and

Council of London had done before him.

Precedents in the line of sumptuary laws, and laws regulat-

ing prices, though less abundant, are no more wanting in this

country than in England. The former may be passed by, as

not specially important here, and with the admission that they
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were neither numerous, nor, under the circumstances of the

country, such as should call for very severe criticism. Nor on

the score of prices was any persistent and permanent policy

established; what was done was meant rather for special

emergencies, than to establish the general course of govern-

ment. Among one of the earliest of Massachusetts colonial

statutes was "An act against oppression," which subjected to

fine and imprisonment such evil-disposed persons as should

oppress and wrong their neighbors by taking excessive wages

for their work or unreasonable prices for their wares. The two

towns of Boston and Charlestown appointed porters and pre-

scribed their lawful charges; but this may perhaps be consid-

ered as a grant of special privilege, with an accompanying re-

striction. In 1672, the weight of a penny-loaf was fixed by law

in the colony, but in the least obnoxious way possible, for it was

by a sliding scale regulated by the price of wheat. This was

after the manner of the English assize of bread, and was fol-

lowed to some extent in other parts of this country. In 1777,

under the stress of a doubtful war, a strong effort was made to

unite the colonies in an agreement upon prices which could be

fixed by law, and the New England colonies came to an agree-

ment which had the approval of Congress, but the others failed

to concur. It has generally been supposed that the attempt to

fix prices by law in this country came to an end when inde-

pendence was firmly established and liberty secured. Up to

that time some of the towns assumed the authority to regulate
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prices. It may safely be asserted, however, that all attempts in

that direction were unsatisfactory. Hubbard, in his General

History, gives this account of the Massachusetts experiment of

1633: "Many new plantations going on at this time made

laborers scarce, and the scarcity made workmen demand exces-

sive wages, for the excusing of which it was pleaded that the

prices of wares with the merchants were proportionable. For

the preventing of oppression in the one and in the other, orders

were made in the General Court that the artificers, such as car-

penters and masons, should not receive above 2s. per diem, and

laborers not above i&/.; and proportionably, merchants should

not advance above tyd. in the shilling above what their goods

cost in England. But these good orders were not of long con-
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tinuances, but did expire with the first and golden age of the

New World, things being raised since to treble the value well-

nigh of what they were." The experiment, it will be seen, was

in the nature of a protective tariff, applied as between different

classes in the same small community. It seems not to have

occurred to the good minister to inquire whether the abandon-

ment may not have been due to the fact that the restriction

was found beneficial to neither party, and that the wise men, of

whom Massachusetts had her full share in those days, were

brought by observation and reflection to the conclusion, that

there were laws determining prices which were inherent in the

nature and circumstances of civilized society, and that the

operation of these was not likely to be improved by legislative

interference. Similar considerations probably led to the aban-

donment of the laws in Maryland, and perhaps some other

colonies, which made the planting of a certain area of corn by

each taxable inhabitant compulsory.

It is not understood to be now pretended that any general

right to fix the price of commodities or to limit the charges for

services can exist as a part of any system of free government.

It seems to be tacitly understood, that whatever power may

once have existed for that purpose has been lost or taken

away, and that business in general is protected against the in-

terference of the state in such matters. Possibly there may be

single individuals or small organizations of men who hold ex-

treme views on this subject, but these would resist the author-
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ity as promptly as any one if the power were to be exercised

in the restriction of the wages of labor, or in restraining agree-

ments amonglaborers having for their object to put up or main- •

tain the standard of prices for their services. It is a fact, how-

ever, of common observation, that there are some cases in

which the legislature is accustomed to limit the charges for

services and for the uses of property, and that the exercise of

the power is acquiesced in as being rightful. These cases,

then, must be supposed to stand upon some principle which dis-

tinguishes them from all others, and what the principle is, and

how the cases may be separated in which the government may

interfere for the prevention of extortion from those in which

it may not, is among the important questions that have re-
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cently attracted attention. There must be or should be a clear

line of distinction somewhere; one that the legislature and the

courts may clearly perceive and apply without danger of serious

error.

By some persons this question has been approached from

what may be called the negative point of view; that is, the

general right of regulation in the discretion of the legislature

is assumed, and those who dispute its rightfulness in the in-

stance are called upon to point out wherefore it is not per-

mitted. For the general right, the strong illustration is given

of the regulation of profits from loans of money. Money, it

is said, is the most valuable and the most greatly desired of

all property; the right to acquire and use it for all lawful pur-

poses is undoubted; and yet from time immemorial the legisla-

ture has laid down rules limiting the charges for the use of it,

and imposing severe penalties for demanding or receiving more;

and this has been done without so much as a suggestion from

any source that constitutional power for the purpose was want-

ing. The fact cannot be disputed, though it may not be possi-

ble to justify it in principle. The general rule the world over

has been that usury was condemned, and only in modern times

has the policy of usury laws been questioned. In part this prob-

ably comes from the fact that government makes money, estab-

lishes its value, and, as this nation knows to its cost, changes its

value at will. If the coin bear the image and superscription

of Caesar; if Caesar may make it of gold to-day, of silver to-

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2013-06-19 14:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3079060
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

morrow, and of paper the day following, changing the value of

all possessions with every change in the currency—may not

Caesar exercise the comparatively insignificant power to regu-

late the charges that may be made for the use of it in loans?

But in still greater part, perhaps, the ideas concerning usury

have come as a part of the Jewish inheritance—as a part of the

law delivered by the mouth of Moses in the wilderness. True,

the Jews were prohibited only from taking usury of their

brethren, but this rule accepted and applied by any other

people must at least preclude the exaction of usury by subject

from subject. For age after age the condemnation of usury

was received by many as a law of perpetual obligation; and

when under the operation of the great law of supply and demand
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men were induced to disregard this divine law, it seemed almost

the performance of an obligation of religion when king and peo-

ple, as the opportunity seemed to be favorable, repudiated their

obligation to the usurers, and robbed them of their gains. To

spoil the Jews who spoil the people seemed almost a Christian

duty ; they were plundered, stoned, and banished; and so great

was the abhorrence of this nation of usurers, that when in the

time of the Great Protector (1655) they humbly prayed to be

received into the realm, this ruler, so wise in most matters,

doubted and hesitated, and spent the next day with his minis-

ters in prayer and fasting; and yet nothing better came of it

than a very zealous remonstrance from Mr. Prynne, who had

no difficulty in proving that permission to the Jews to reside

in England would be "the greatest affront offered to the Son

of God, the author of our redemption, that any Christian gov-

ernment could be guilty of." The history of England in this

regard was not singular. Money-lenders the world over, wher-

ever the laws were such as to permit, had been rapacious and

cruel, and the poor of every country had suffered at their

hands. When Solon set about preparing a code for Athens,

he found that the existing laws permitted men to borrow money

on the credit of their bodies, and not of their own merely, but

those of their wives, their children, and their unmarried sisters;

and failure to meet their obligations subjected the persons

pledged to be sold into slavery. Great numbers had been thus

sold, and were to be found scattered over Greece, and even in
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foreign parts. The evil was so enormous and the oppressions

had been so cruel, that Solon deemed it necessary to set all

the slaves of usury free, and to annul all existing contracts—a

measure of repudiation only justified by the most absolute

necessity. The statement of Aristotle has been frequently

quoted, that money was naturally barren, and that to attempt

to make money breed money was preposterous, and a manifest

perversion of the purpose for which money was created, which

was as a convenience in trade and commerce. When Cato the

Censor denounced loans at interest as a crime, he but ex-

pressed a very common sentiment.

The common law implied no promise to make compensa-

tion forthe use of money loaned, though it did imply a prom-
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ise in the case of other loans for use. When America severed

her connection with Great Britain, usury was a penal offence,

and the regulation of the interest of money was thought to be

one of the most imperative duties of the government. It was

furnishing protection for the weak against the strong, the help-

less against the grasping and extortionate. American consti-

tutional history consequently begins with money in thrall;

from time immemorial the government had established regula-

tions, not only as a matter of course, but in the supposed per-

formance of a great governmental duty. The emancipation of

money from this governmental control has since been in prog-

ress; in England, by Statute 16th and 17th Victoria, it is now

complete, while America lags behind.

The present argument has no concern with the policy of

usury laws; but this may be safely affirmed, that no conclusion

in favor of the constitutional right to limit the profits from kinds

of property that were never in thrall can be drawn from the

fact that corresponding restrictions are not yet wholly removed

from property that was never emancipated. To appreciate the

illogical character of such a conclusion, there must be kept in

view the manner in which the constitutional principles have

come to America. They have not, to use the language of

Burke in his Letter to the Old Whigs, "been struck out at an

heat by a set of presumptuous men," but they have been

evolved slowly, and under great trials and difficulties; some of

them attained full and rounded proportions before others came
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to be more than faintly recognized; the growth of all has been

historical, circumstances first giving to one a prominence and a

vigor, and afterwards another. With such a growth, a barbarous

anomaly, never yet wholly eradicated, and standing among free

principles as a great and striking exception, ought to be neither

surprising nor misleading. Had the facts been otherwise, had

all constitutional principles been planned and settled upon by a

body of men meeting for the purpose, and embodying them in

a written instrument as an aggregate and harmonious whole,

there would be good reason to demand harmony in their con-

struction, and to assume that what seemed an anomaly could

only be a principle misunderstood or misapplied. The his-

torical development of a constitution, however, never was and
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never can be entirely symmetrical; and it must be admitted

that the grand old common law, of which American constitu-

tional principles formed a part, and for which the fathers perilled

and some of them gave up their lives, had embodied in it more

than one feature of barbarism, and indeed, as many believe, is

not yet wholly relieved of serious anomalies. Whoever believes

that the principles he accepts as fundamental form, when taken

together, a complete and perfect code, and insure to the people

all the protection that is needful, may glorify it as such ; but the

wise statesman, though he may insist that the Constitution is

the best ever known, will nevertheless admit that it has not yet

reached that state of perfection in which it may be regarded as

incapable of improvement. And he would be a bold lawyer

who would venture to affirm that any code of laws now in ex-

istence is wholly free from incongruities.

It has also been thought that the limits of state authority

in restricting the profits of business may be determined by a

solution of the question whether the property by means of

which the business is carried on is " affected with a public inter-

est," whereby it ceases to be juris privati, and is brought, like

all public interests, within the special supervision and control of

the state. But in the attempt to ascertain what it is that affects

private property with a public interest one seems to be feeling

his way in the darkness, and at the best is compelled to accept

and be satisfied with such uncertain light as the instances of

state interference can afford. Certain occupations are named
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which from time immemorial have been subjected to exceptional

legislative regulations, and it is assumed that the property

employed in these is affected with a public interest, and that in

this fact is found the justification for the control exercised.

Starting with these as unquestioned and unquestionable cases,

the conclusion is drawn that the same authority must exist in

certain other cases which are so far analogous as not to be dis-

tinguishable in principle.

The phrase "affected with a public interest" is important in

this discussion, and as it comes from the treatise " De Portibus

Maris" of Lord Hale, it is needful to know in what sense he

employed it. The important passage from that treatise is the

following: "A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a
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port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates

he and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage,

pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do,

viz., makes the most of his own. If the king or subject have a

public wharf, unto which all persons that come to that port must

come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose, because

they are the wharfs only licensed by the queen—or because

there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a

port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbi-

trary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc.,

neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the

duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the

king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and

other conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they

cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in

new building on his own land, it is now no longer bare private

interest, but is affected by a public interest."

To appreciate the exact force of this language, it is neces-

sary to understand that the erection of a wharf on navigable

water in Great Britain was never a matter of right, but always

of privilege. In the first place, the ports were creatures of the

prerogative; no man at will could run his vessel into a haven

and land his goods where he pleased, but the haven must first

be made a port, and officers of the customs assigned to it. In

the second place, the title to the soil of all tide-waters below

high-water mark pertained to the crown, and any wharf erected
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there without lawful permission was a purpresture, and liable to

be removed as such. A wharf must therefore be specially and

expressly licensed; and if not licensed expressly, it was only in

existence by the tolerance of the crown, and on or adjacent to

land belonging to the crown, and without the use of which the

property could not be made available. Whether, therefore, the

wharf was licensed and thereby given special and exclusive

privileges, or had been set up without license, Lord Hale had

for his assertion that it was affected with a public interest this

justification—that it was erected by express or implied public

permission, on or in connection with public property, and for

the accommodation of the public by means of a private business.

This is all that can be claimed from this passage from Lord
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Hale; and it seems quite reasonable for him to declare that

one who under such circumstances had a monopoly of the busi-

ness might justly be compelled to deal with the public on rea-

sonable terms.

It is now important to know what classes of private business

are so circumstanced that the like reasons will apply. It would

seem that these must be very few indeed. The case of the

miller is often given as an illustration, and it is said that the

state has always controlled the use of his property to some

extent, and limited the tolls he has been permitted to exact

for grinding his neighbors' grist. It will not be disputed that

this was formerly done: the question of authority to do so now

is not so plain. As a rule, mills in England were formerly the

property of the lord of the manor, who by prescription had an

exclusive right to grind grain for his tenants. But an exclu-

sive right of that sort could only exist in connection with recip-

rocal rights on the part of tenants to be served at fair prices;

and these could only be protected by positive law. The right

of statute regulation may thus be said to result as a necessary

consequence of the dependence of the tenant upon the mill for his

bread. English ideas on the subject were brought by the colo-

nists to this country, and necessity co-operated with these in

shaping public policy in respect to mills. Among the earliest

legislative acts in Maryland is one providing that "any bargain

which the Lt. General and Council shall make with any under-

taker for the setting up of a water mill for the use of this colony,
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shall be levied upon all the inhabitants of the colony, in such

manner as the Lt. General and Council shall appoint, so it

exceed not 10,000 lb. tobacco in a year, for two years only."

This was in 1633—the same year that the first mill was set up

in Massachusetts; and though it may not be affirmed that gov-

ernment aid was given in the case last mentioned, yet as it is

stated that it was erected "by leave of the plantation on Ne-

ponset River," it seems probable that it was either set up on

the common property, or that special privileges were obtained

and corresponding duties imposed. One special privilege of

the highest importance was certainly granted to millers in the

colonial period; that, namely, of obtaining water-power by means

of an appropriation of the lands of others under the sovereign

17
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power of eminent domain. This might well be regarded as an

equivalent for the obligation which millers were required to

assume, to grind corn for a stipulated toll. A reference to the

laws of New Hampshire will show how the two things were

often coupled together. Thus the law of 1718 by one section

limited the tolls for grinding grain; and by another it gave the

miller the right to flow the lands of others by means of his dam,

on the payment of damages, if any, that should be assessed by

a sheriff's jury. Now, when one appeals to the state to put

forth on his behalf its sovereign authority to compel another to

abandon to him his freehold, he does so on the express and

necessary claim that his business is "affected with a public

interest," and that in short he proposes to act as an agency for

the public in accomplishing some public purpose or supplying

some public necessity. In a number of the States the proprie-

tors of grist-mills are still permitted to appropriate for their

purposes the lands of non-assenting parties; but in some it is

denied that authority can be constitutionally conferred for this

purpose unless for mills which are brought under State regu-

lations, compelling them to grind grain for all who come,

impartially, and for an established toll. In general, however,

it is believed that when the rates of toll are fixed by law,

the intent of the law is not to fix a maximum, and there-

by to preclude the parties making their own arrangements,

but the rate named is merely one which is to govern when

the parties deal with each other without special understand-
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ing. But whether this belief is well founded or not, it seems

apparent that no very forcible argument for the authority

to regulate prices in other business can be deduced from a case

so exceptional as that of millers. Regulations of their charges

certainly began when their business was affected with a public

interest; and if the regulation has continued after the justifica-

tion for it has ceased, it is perhaps because there has never been

provocation to question its rightfulness.

In an early case in Alabama it was decided that the legisla-

ture might confer upon a municipality the authority to fix the

price of bread. In what are known as the Warehouse Cases,

recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was said

by the learned judge who delivered the governing opinion that
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this is still permitted by the laws of Illinois. The long experi-

ence of that judge in the administration of the law does not

admit of any question being raised as to the fact; though

whether the authority is conferred by municipal charters in

specific terms, or is supposed to rest in some general grant of

power, is not stated. If, however, the statutes of any State

do now rightfully confer this authority, either in special terms

or by general grant, it would seem we might stop the discus-

sion here, and admit that there is nothing in this direction the

legislature may not do. In the Alabama case the Court seem to

plant the right on the fact that the calling "affects the public

interest, or private property is employed in a manner which

directly affects the body of the people." Now, why does the

baker's calling specially affect the public interest? If it is for

any other reason than because he sells to the public one of the

necessaries of life, the reason would probably have been men-

tioned. But the merchant does the same when he sells clothing,

the druggist when he sells medicines, the butcher when he sells

his meat; and if it is conceded that religious instruction is essen-

tial in a free state, as several of the State constitutions affirm,

then the clergyman does the same when he imparts religious

instruction and advice; and merchant, druggist, butcher, and

clergyman may all have the prices of their wares or their ser-

vices prescribed by law. A distinction in principle between the

cases cannot be pointed out, because it does not exist. The

right to fix the weight of bread is clear enough; that is only a
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reasonable regulation to prevent imposition, and stands on the

same ground with the requirement of inspection of fish and

other provisions.

Ferrymen and owners of toll-bridges, it is said, also have

their charges limited by law. This is true. But these parties

have special privileges conferred upon them by law—generally,

to some extent at least, exclusive; and they are allowed the sov-

ereign privilege of levying toll. The rights they have are not

open to general competition; and, as they are given by law, it

would be strange indeed if the law in giving could not limit its

gift. The law does limit the gift in various ways: it restricts

the tolls, and it compels attendance of ferrymen and gate-

keepers at all suitable hours, under penalty; it gives special
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privileges, and it imposes obligations for the public benefit in

return. Reference is here made only to those ferries and

bridges which are highways, and in respect to which alone does

the law undertake to exercise the authority mentioned; if a

man sees fit to carry passengers, either by boat or bridge, over

a stream, entirely on his own land, his boat or bridge consti-

tutes no part of a public highway, and there is no authority for

saying that in doing so he exercises a calling which in any sense

is public. He may carry whomsoever he pleases, refusing to

carry others; may carry when he pleases, and at any rates

agreed upon, or at a reasonable consideration when no rates are

fixed; he may attend when he pleases; and if his business is a

public business, so as to be brought under legislative control,

so must be the tailor's and the cobbler's. In saying this, how-

ever, it is assumed that he does not hold himself out as a com-

mon carrier; when he does that, he becomes subject to certain

exceptional regulations; but whether these can extend to the

regulation of prices, is a question which will be referred to a

little further on.

The rule may be said to be general, that whenever a special

privilege is conceded to private parties, the enjoyment of which

requires an exceptional use by them, or in connection with

their business, of the public highways, either by water or by land,

and the privilege is conferred for some accommodation they

are to supply to the public, the property in their business is

affected, to some extent at least, with a public interest. This
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rule will embrace several of the cases in which legislative regu-

lations and restrictions are customarily made. The case is all

the stronger where the privilege conferred is in the nature of a

monopoly. That was the fact in the warehouse case of All-

nutt vs. Inglis, decided by the Court of King's Bench in 1810.

The warehousemen whose rights were then in question were

permitted to receive wines directly from the importing vessels,

before the duties were paid; it was an exclusive and valuable

privilege, and was given and received in view of common-law

rules, which would obligate them to receive the wines for a rea-

sonable compensation. They undertook to appropriate the

privilege, and to repudiate any corresponding obligation; in

.other words, while taking the benefit of the privilege, they
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practically asserted the prerogative of compelling the public to

submit to any charges they might see fit to impose: a mon-

strous proposition, in view of the fact that the public had no

privilege of dealing with others. The controversy is thus

stated by Lord Ellenborough: "The question on this record

is whether the London Dock Company have a right to insist

upon receiving wines into their warehouses for a hire and re-

ward arbitrary and at their will and pleasure, or whether they

were bound to receive them there for a reasonable reward only.

There is no doubt that the general principle is favored both in

law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases

upon his own property or the use of it; but if, for a particular

purpose, the public have a right to resort to his premises and

make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that

purpose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must,

as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable

terms." Such a case seems to require no comment: the con-

clusion of the court is so reasonable and just, that the only

wonder is that the doctrine which Lord Ellenborough put aside

as untenable could ever have been advanced.

There may also be rejected, as not requiring special discus-

sion or consideration, the case of every employment, the follow-

ing of which is not of right, but of favor. The case of an auc-

tioneer may be instanced: he performs a public function, and is

only allowed to take it upon himself by license. Wherever the

business is a privilege, and the taking out of a license is required,

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2013-06-19 15:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3079060
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the state may impose conditions upon the privilege. The case

of hackney-coachmen and draymen may be classed in the same

category: their avocations have always been licensed and re-

strained; and one of the most usual and perhaps most neces-

sary restraints is that which is imposed in respect to their

charges. Moreover, these persons are allowed to establish a

business in the public highways; they stand there with their

conveyances, occupying the streets to the inconvenience, more

or less, of the general public, and in ways that would not be

permitted but for the special conveniences they afford. Their

privileges give them special opportunities for extortion and for

practising frauds upon strangers, and the police supervision is

required to be exceptionally active and strict. It is not of
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right that they shall have the privileges which are conceded to

them: they might be required to stand for business on private

grounds instead of in the streets, just as the merchant awaits

his customers at his store, and the mechanic at his shop. The

exceptional use which by law or by custom they are permitted

to make of the public streets for the conveniences they afford

is quite sufficient to affect their vehicles with a public interest;

and they can reasonably no more contest the conditions than

could a huckster who should be allowed on special terms to set

up a booth on the public market-ground. Moreover, it may be

said of this case as of usury, that the regulations are from time

immemorial.

Whether the regulation of the business of carriers of per-

sons and goods may extend to the fixing of prices, is a ques-

tion which has received no little attention, and been the sub-

ject of much earnest controversy for the last three or four

years. The right in the state to make exceptional regulations

of some sort for the case of common carriers is not disputed;

the common law itself made some, the most important of which

was the requirement that persons in this business should re-

ceive and carry, for all who offered, with impartiality. The

Congressional Civil Rights Act of 1875 has supplemented this

by a provision forbidding discriminations in the carriage of

persons, based on race, color, or previous condition; and many

of the States have regulations to further secure impartiality in

the dealings of these persons with the public. But a regula-
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tion to secure impartiality is so different in principle from one

limiting prices, that the power to establish the one affords no

presumption in favor of the authority to do the other. The

first is only in furtherance of, and supplementary to, the com-

mon-law requirement of fairness; but the common law is put

aside and reversed when the statute undertakes to prescribe

what a man shall charge for his services.

When carriers are corporations, so much depends upon their

contract with the state that their cases are very apt to be ex-

ceptional. It has been decided by a great weight of authority,

that where a railway charter reserves to the state an unlimited

right of amendment, this right may be exercised in restricting

charges for transportation. In the able opinion of the Chief-
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Justice of Wisconsin to that effect, it is intimated that, inde-

pendent of this reserved power of amendment, the same thing

might be done under the power of police. The idea underly-

ing such a suggestion may perhaps be formulated as follows:

1. Railways, by general concession, are such public conve-

niences that the sovereign power of eminent domain is allowed

to be exercised in their favor in the appropriation of lands of

non-assenting parties. 2. It has been claimed, and generally

conceded, that the public have such a general interest in rail-

ways, that taxes may be levied and paid over to the projectors

to aid them in constructing and equipping their road. 3. The

argument will then be made that if the state may bring its

sovereign power to their assistance, because of the public bene-

fits they are expected to confer, and if it may and does invest

its own money in their property, they must, by accepting such

assistance, be held estopped to dispute the claim of the state

that their property is affected with a public interest. The

subject is one having many sides, and so important that any

court called upon to consider it would not venture to express

any but the most mature and carefully considered opinion.

The discussions hitherto have elicited nothing very conclusive

or authoritative on the main question.

The case of innkeepers is sometimes said to be one in which

the right of the state to limit charges is indisputable; but if

an attempt should be made to exercise it, it would probably be

contested with vigor. Like common carriers, innkeepers are
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subject to special regulations at the common law, and the Civil

Rights Act also includes them among the persons who are for-

bidden to discriminate because of race, color, or previous con-

dition. But these regulations, as in the case of carriers, are in

the interest of impartiality, and they are not supposed to be

burdensome to the business in any sense. Possibly the notions

on this subject may have come from the fact that places of en-

tertainment for travellers have generally been places for the sale

of intoxicating drinks, and such places are usually required to

be licensed, and the number is purposely or indirectly limited.

Sufficient reason for this is found in the fact that the business

brings many evils upon society, and is so likely to breed dis-

orders and tumult, that exceptional police supervision is im-
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perative. It is, at best, only a tolerated business, and is always

subjected to special restraint when not altogether prohibited.

But the business of entertaining travellers has no necessary

connection with this; and it is not only a commendable and

useful, but it is also a necessary business.

It is safe to classify, in the following manner, the cases in

which usage will warrant one in saying that private property,

invested and managed for the benefit of the owners, is affected

with a public interest.

1. Where the business is one the following of which is not

matter of right, but is permitted by the state as a privilege or

franchise. Under this head would be ranged the business of set-

ting up lotteries; of giving shows, "etc.; of keeping billiard-

tables for hire; and of selling intoxicating drinks, when the

sale, by unlicensed parties, is forbidden. Also, the case of toll-

bridges, etc.

2. When the state, on public grounds, renders to the busi-

ness special assistance by taxation or otherwise.

3. When, for the accommodation of the business, some

special use is allowed to be made of public property or of a

public easement.

4. Where exclusive privileges are granted in consideration

of some special return to be made to the public.

In each of these cases the public interest is manifest. If

there are any not coming under these heads, the interest ought

to be equally capable of being pointed out.
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Passing now to the nature of the control the state may

exercise in the regulation of business within the limits of its

authority, the following may be suggested as fundamental

rules:

1. The state should restrain and seek to prevent whatever

would impede its people in making free disposal of their wares

or their services on the best terms a free market may offer.

2. The state should abstain on its own part from interpos-

ing impediments to its people reaping the advantages of com-

petition in all lawful employments.

As to these rules, there ought to be and probably will be no

disagreemer*. Indeed, those who have gone farthest in de-

manding state intervention to limit the profits of business
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have justified the demand on the ground that the business they

desired to have regulated and restrained was a virtual monop-

oly, so that the regulation was needed to give competition,

not to prevent it. In the Warehouse Cases already referred to,

this was said; and it was strongly urged that unless the charges

of Chicago warehousemen were limited to a maximum, the

public had no protection against the extortions of a monopoly.

The word monopoly has an ominous sound to American

ears, and whenever the appellation fairly attaches itself to any

thing, it is already condemned in the public mind. Monopolies

are heard of with great frequency in English history, and at

some periods they have played a very important part in public

affairs. It must be conceded, however, that those against

which the complaints have been loudest were monopolies the

government itself had set up; not monopolies of individual

establishment, which the government was called upon to curb

or to destroy. An instance may be taken of a monopoly in

alum, granted by King Henry VI. The king had received a

quantity of that article for £4000, which he sold for ^8000,

granting in the sale an exclusive privilege to the vendees of

dealing in alum within the realm for a term of years. King

Henry VII. created a similar monopoly in this same article,by

conferring upon a Tuscan merchant the privilege of importing

a certain quantity, and prohibiting the importation by any one

else until he had sold this off. To grant such a monopoly was

a favorite resort of the crown when money was needed for per-
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sonal uses, and as a consideration of some sort was generally

received for it, this was equivalent to levying a tax and farming

out the collection of it to parties who had paid in advance.

But monopolies were not always granted for money. In 1245,

Henry III., to spite the London traders, ordered all shops in

London to be closed for fifteen days for the benefit of fairs pro-

claimed by him at Westminster. Similar orders were repeatedly

issued afterwards, but it is some satisfaction to be informed by

the chronicles that the monopolists profited little, for the rains

of heaven sometimes destroyed goods of greater value than all

the profits. Queen Elizabeth dealt largely in monopolies, and Sir

Walter Raleigh, over whose sad fate men sometimes mourn, did

not scruple to find his profit in them. In the great debate upon

258 THE PRINCETON REVIEW.

them in 1601, Sir Robert Wroth said there were then in being

patents of monopoly for " currants, iron, powder, cards, ox shin-

bones, train oyl, transportation of leather, lists of cloth, ashes,

anis seed, vinegar, seacoals, steel, aqua vitae, brushes, pots,

saltpeter, lead, accidences, oyl, calamin stone, oyl of blubber,

fumachoes or dried pitchers in the smoak, and divers others."

"Upon reciting the patents aforesaid, Mr. Hakewell stood up

and asked thus: Is not bread there? Bread, quoth one; bread,

quoth another; this voice seems strange, quoth another; this

voice seems strange, quoth a third. No, quoth Mr. Hakewell,

but if order be not taken for these, bread will be there before

the next Parliament." And the queen was pleased to take

order concerning these, and to repeal them, protesting that

"never did I put my pen to any grant but that upon pretence

and semblance made unto me that it was both good and bene-

ficial to the subjects in general, though a private profit to

some of my ancient servants who had deserved well; but the

contrary being found by experience, I am exceeding beholding

to such subjects as would move the same at first." The evil,

however, did not stop here, even for this reign; but it rose to

enormous magnitude under the first Stuart, and prior to 1623

nearly all the foreign trade of the kingdom was in the hands of

a few people in London, who, under their royal grants, were

enabled to fix the prices both of imports and exports. In that

year the king was forced by the Commons to give his assent to

a law which declared monopolies by royal grant illegal, and the
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most of those in existence were repealed. Of those which

escaped repeal was that to the East India Company, which grew

to such proportions afterwards. Charles I. revived monopolies,

and in 1640, in debate in Parliament, Sir John Colepeper said of

them: "I have but one grievance more to offer unto you; but

this one compriseth many; it is a nest of wasps, a swarm of

vermine, which have overcrept the land; I mean the mono-

polers and polers of the people: these, like the frogs of Egypt,

have got possession of our dwellings, and we have scarce a

room free from them: they sip in our cup, they dip in our dish,

they sit by our fire; we find them in the dye-vat, wash-bowl,

and powdering tub; they share with the butler in his box, they

have marked and sealed us from head to foot. Mr. Speaker,
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they will not bate us a pin: we may not buy our own cloathes

without their brokage. These are thejeaches that have sucked

the commonwealth so hard, that it has almost become hectical.

And, Mr. Speaker, some of these are ashamed of their right

names; they have a vizard to hide the brand made by that

good law in the last Parliament of King James; they shelter

themselves under the name of a corporation; they make bye-

laws which serve their turns to squeeze us and fill their purses;

unface these, and they will prove as bad cards as any in the

pack." The House not only resolved against monopolies, but

it resolved that no monopolist or patentee should be allowed to

sit in that House; and several were turned out under this vote.

Charles I. even assumed to himself the prerogative of limiting

the growth of the city of London, and levied fees for the privi-

lege of building houses in extension of its limits. His assump-

tions were of course illegal; indeed, monopolies by royal grant

to the prejudice of trade had been judicially declared void in

1602, and in their most odious forms they disappeared when

Charles I. lost his head. Meantime America was only suffered

to be colonized under the permission of trading monopolies.

It was certainly not this kind of monopoly that was brought

under condemnation in the Warehouse Cases, for no grant of

special privilege had been given, nor, under the constitution of

Illinois, could any have been given. There is another sort

known to the English law which has been more or less obnox-

ious, namely, the monopoly of provisions, effected usually by
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combination, with a view unnaturally to raise prices. This was

a common-law offence, but with several kindred common-law

offences has been abolished in England. It is possible that it

may in early times, when the means of transportation were im-

perfect, have been a serious evil, but it is inconceivable that it

can be so now, except where it is accomplished through means

which are no part of any regular business. If means are em-

ployed which public policy cannot sanction, it is competent and

proper for the state to interfere.

A monopoly, where the term is employed with the care and

accuracy proper in judicial decisions and legal proceedings,

must be understood as some exclusive power to dispose of

something of value, either generally, or for some definite time,

260 THE PRINCETON REVIEW.

or within certain limits. The method in which it may be se-

cured has nothing to do with its exclusive character, and it is

equally a monopoly whether obtained by sovereign grant or

secured by individual management. If the exclusive right to

dispose of their services in any given capacity at an important

business centre were secured in any way by a few persons,

those persons would have a monopoly, whether the right were

obtained by sovereign grant, by combination, or by employing

violence and terror to drive away all who might be competitors.

The sovereign grant of monopolies in trade was declared un-

lawful in England, on the ground that " the sole trade of any

mechanical artifice, or any other monopoly, is not only a damage

and prejudice to those who exercise the same trade, but also to

all other subjects, for the end of all these monopolies is for the

private gain of the patentees." There may doubtless be exclu-

sive privileges that would not be subject to this condemnation,

but they must clearly be in cases not coming within the reasons

assigned. An author or inventor is given for a certain term an

exclusive right in that which his talent or ingenuity has pro-

duced; but the right here is in something which he himself has

created, and which ought to be his property, as much as the wheat

he has grown, or the cattle he has raised or bought. Exclusive

franchises are sometimes given where in no other way can some

public interest be accomplished; but the reasons ought to be

of the most conclusive nature, and the state grant ought to be

construed with the utmost strictness. To whatever extent special
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privileges are conferred upon one, he is favored, and equality

of right under the government is disturbed. Nevertheless spe-

cial privileges are sometimes defensible, and sometimes a grant

of them may be supported on grounds of necessity.

If the mere fact that a business has or may become a monop-

oly can give to the legislature an authority to interfere and

restrain it, it must be because a monopoly is in itself so mani-

festly and necessarily opposed to public policy as to be wholly

inadmissible. But when any thing is wholly inadmissible, the

legislature itself must be without the power to create it. A

thing cannot be wrong when growing up independently, and

right when set up under a special statute. Therefore, if by

enterprise or management a virtual monopoly is created at any
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point, it must be subject to no more and no other condemnation

than would be a monopoly of precisely the same sort expressly

created. But in this country men are precluded from claiming

that monopolies of legislative creation are subject to special

restraints because of their exclusive features. A short provi-

sion inserted in the Federal Constitution to prevent the general

repudiation of debts has been found to embrace within its pro-

tection the grants of exclusive privileges made by the state.

Whatever grant, therefore, is made by the state is protected, if

the grant was within the legislative competence. Queen Eliza-

beth might recall the vicious monopolies she had granted, and

Parliament might at any time repeal them or bring them under

control, but no future Coke in this country can wage the same

exterminating war upon them which was waged by the great

Chief-Justice in England. It would not be enough for him to

show that the object of his.attack was a monopoly; he must go

farther and show some additional vice, or the legislative grant

would be shielded from his attack behind the aegis of the

Federal Constitution. Primd facie all legislative grants are

made for conclusive reasons; and with the utmost propriety it

is always assumed that all laws, whether public or private, have

been adopted from honest motives and on sufficient grounds.

Therefore, though the benefits may apparently all be of individ-

ual and personal nature, the law implies and the judiciary and

the executive must hold that public considerations governed the

legislative action. In general, however obnoxious the special
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privilege may seem to be, objectors will be required to show

how and in what language it is forbidden in the State Consti-

tution before they can effectually assail it. A few illustrations

will give some idea of the extent of State power in the grant of

monopolies. Some of the early railroad charters were exclu-

sive, and gave a complete monopoly within certain prescribed

limits; and it is notorious that those in New Jersey have caused

the country much annoyance. In two or more of the States

there have been grants of the exclusive right to navigate public

waters, and these have been sustained where they did not come

in conflict with the regulations of commerce established by

Congress. The Binghamton Bridge case is worthy of special

mention. The Legislature of New York at an early day created
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an incorporation to construct a toll-bridge across the Chenango

River, and in the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court the

terms of the grant, though not very clear and explicit, were

such as to give an exclusive privilege to maintain a bridge

across the river for a length of four miles. The growth of

towns along this part of the river in time made other bridges

essential, and the legislature created another corporation, which

it undertook to authorize to build a second bridge within the

same limits. The new grant was held to be a violation of the

Constitution of the United States, and therefore void. It was

in vain that Mr. Justice Grier expressed the opinion that " the

power of one legislature to bind themselves and their posterity,

and all future legislatures, from authorizing a bridge absolutely

required for public use, might well be denied by the courts of

New York;" the Court did not concur in this view, and consid-

ered themselves bound by the precedents to the contrary. The

New Orleans Slaughter House Case deserves at least a passing

mention. In the troublous days immediately following the war,

when the passions of the people were so inflamed on questions

growing out of the civil conflict as to preclude any careful

supervision of legislation by the general public, the Legislature

of Louisiana granted to a corporate body the exclusive privi-

lege for twenty-five years of slaughtering cattle in New Orleans

and its immediate vicinity, limiting their charges it is true, but

making them sufficiently liberal. This grant the courts have

felt compelled to sustain. If the legislature could lawfully

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2013-06-19 15:05 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3079060
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

create this monopoly, why not create a similar monopoly of ware-

housing? And if they did create one, what should prevent

their fixing the rates as high as they have ever been fixed by

individual warehousemen? It is notorious that the tolls taken

on numerous bridges through the country are such as could not

be sustained for a day if the legislative protection were taken

away, and the tolls were left to competition. A single other

illustration of exclusive grants will suffice. In Alabama and

Missouri the grant of a lottery franchise has been held irrevo-

cable. It would seem that all the way between the building of

railways and the setting up of lotteries there must be room for

monopolies almost as numerous as those in England, the schedule

of which was given by Sir Robert Wroth. Whatever exist will
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generally be found now, as in King James's time, " to shelter

themselves under the name of a corporation."

But the following question is worthy of serious considera-

tion by legislators: If the state in respect to any particular

occupation may prescribe prices, may it not also, on the same

reasons and in the same occupation, set up a monopoly? The

question is of vital interest, and its consideration requires an

examination of the grounds on which exclusive privileges in

the nature of monopolies are supposed to be granted. The fol-

lowing may be suggested:

1. The grant of an exclusive privilege may seem to be

necessary to the accomplishment of some important public

object which, with the privilege, private parties would under-

take to accomplish, when without it they would not. The

familiar instance is that of a bridge across a river where a high-

way for teams, etc., is greatly needed. Such a bridge con-

structed with the privilege in the proprietors to take toll might

perhaps be expected to be unprofitable for a considerable

period. The state at the time might be unwilling or unable to

construct it, but perfectly willing to clothe individuals with the

proper franchise for the purpose. These might be quite ready

to accept the franchise if they could be protected against ruin-

ous competition by the privilege being made exclusive, when

otherwise they would refuse it. Under such circumstances,

making the franchise exclusive may seem to the legislature the

only condition upon which the needed public convenience may
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be obtained, and public considerations may apparently prepon-

derate in favor of conceding it.

2. An exclusive privilege may be granted for a consideration

received or to be received by the state, and which by adding to

the resources of the state would diminish taxation, and thus

compensate for any incidental inconvenience or loss felt or

suffered by the people in consequence of the grant.

Thus a railroad company having a charter with exclusive

features may accept it on condition of paying a certain propor-

tion of its earnings to the state; another corporation may pay

a certain bonus for its charter; a third may consent to pay an

annual license fee in addition to the regular taxes; and so on.
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Many grants have been made on this principle, and in some

cases the profit to the state has been large.

3. An exclusive privilege may be granted as a measure of

regulation. Thus, in the case of some particular business it may

be thought that it is so susceptible of abuses, so liable to be

engaged in for the purposes of fraud or extortion, and furnishes

such facilities for the one or the other, that the good of the

community requires it to be either prohibited altogether or put

in the hands of one or of a few persons, who shall first take out

a state license under stringent conditions, and afterwards be

subjected to a supervision which could not be extended if the

business were open to every one. Taking the case of lotteries

for an illustration, it might well be said, if lotteries are to be

allowed at all, the opportunities they furnish for fraud are so

great and so numerous, that the interest of the community

would be better subserved by allowing a few persons only, of

good reputation, to set up a lottery once a year, paying a reason-

able license fee for the privilege, than to allow any man or

combination of men to set up one at discretion. So in the case

of slaughtering cattle for the markets of a large city, it might be

said that if any considerable number of persons made this a busi-

ness it might prove difficult if not impossible to prevent many

nuisances, and since each person must have a separate place of

business, there could be no such economy of labor and expense

as might be possible with a concentration of the business in one

or in a few establishments. Therefore it might be urged that
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to give an exclusive privilege to a single company or corpora-

tion, with a reasonable limitation of the charges which might be

made to the dealers in meats, would on the one hand be a

matter of general economy and public utility in that it would

tend to reduce the cost of one of the necessaries of life, and on

the other would assist in the preservation of the public health.

These, apparently, are the two principal grounds which must

be advanced in support of the grant of an exclusive privilege

when the purpose is one of regulation merely: to obtain more

perfect and effectual police supervision and protection against

disorders and nuisances, and to effect a general saving to the

people in some matter of general or customary expense. The
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•

first ought generally to be subordinate, if the business regulated

is a necessary and useful business. The police power of the state

is so pervading and ample, and it is so plainly the duty of the

state to exercise it in such a manner as to protect every man in

following any lawful calling he may select, so long as he violates

no public law and no rights of others, that for the state to give

monopolies as a substitute for such protection, would be to make

its own delinquency an excuse for invidious distinctions.

Can, then, a monopoly be granted where the sole or chief

purpose is to effect a saving in the cost to the people of some-

thing which is an article of public and general need? For the

moment putting aside the consideration of the cases in which

any exclusive privileges would be inadmissible, and conceding

the right in some cases, let the grounds which must support them

be examined. If a saving of individual expense can be a suffi-

cient ground, it must be because the state has devolved upon

it a duty to so shape its legislation as to effect such a saving,

and the special privilege is a suitable means to the end. This

brings us at once upon the ground which must be occupied by

the legislature in limiting prices of wares or the charges for

services: the reduction is the principal thing, and the legisla-

ture in accomplishing this will judge of the available and suit-

able means, and selecting these will employ them. In one case

a direct act of legislation restricting charges might seem the

most suitable and effectual, as it would certainly aim most
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directly at the end sought. In another case the more practical

mode might seem to be to authorize a monopoly. One city

might perhaps grant an exclusive privilege in slaughtering cattle;

another, to accomplish the same end, might fix maximum prices

by the carcass or the pound of the cattle slaughtered. Each

would justify the regulation on the same ground.

It would seem, therefore, that those who claim a right in the

state to control prices in certain cases should concede the

power to create monopolies in the same cases, and whoever

denies the one may deny the other. And if this be so, the

question of the rightfulness of special privileges may perhaps

be found so intimately connected with the question of state in-

terference to regulate prices as to be incapable of separation.

18
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Of the cases in which the legislature has sometimes granted

special and exclusive privileges the following remarks may be

made:

i. The right to grant these in certain cases not very dis.

tinctly classified by any authority is generally conceded. They

are always supposed to be granted on public grounds and jus-

tifiable occasions, and as it is proper to grant them, so also it is

proper to receive them, and the grantees could not, because of

their exclusive nature, be subject to reproach or to invidious

regulations.

2. Where the grant is to take up some employment which

is not of general right, or to exercise some franchise, the author-

ity in the state to make it exclusive cannot be disputed. The

state grants the right or the franchise to one man or body of

men, and refuses to grant it to others; it stops with the one

grant, as it may lawfully do. This remark assumes that the

state constitution contains no express prohibition of exclusive

privileges, as some of them do, and that the legislature is left

unhampered in that regard.

3. The authority of the state to grant exclusive privileges

in the ordinary occupations of life it must be quite safe to deny.

If such an authority existed, there would be such a legislative

supremacy over the business of the people as could at any time

be employed to the destruction of any particular interest; and

this would be inconsistent with regulated liberty. As has

already been stated, exclusive privileges of this sort were judi-
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cially declared unlawful and void in the time of Elizabeth, and

have been so held and understood ever since. The cases in

which exclusive privileges may be granted would therefore

seem to be those which, on grounds already stated, are affected

with a public interest.

Some remarks regarding licenses and license fees seem to be

called for in this connection. An idea seems to prevail in some

quarters that to require persons following any particular occu

pation to take out a license is all that is essential to subject

them to special regulations. This idea has no foundation.

Taxes, in the form of license fees, may undoubtedly be imposed

on all occupations, but a free state has no power to compel the
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taking out of a license as a condition precedent to the following

of the ordinary pursuits of life. No despot ever claimed or exer-

cised such a power, and no people not absolute slaves would

tolerate its exercise for a single day. It will be remembered

that the statutes enacted in the Southern States in 1865-6,

which required freedmen to take out licenses for ordinary occu-

pations, and to pay license fees therefor, were set aside, as

establishing regulations which in effect compelled this class to

submit to involuntary servitude.

Licenses may doubtless be required to be taken out by those

employed in occupations the following of which is not a

matter of right, and those which are "affected with a public

interest" under the principles hereinbefore stated. But in the

case of the ordinary and necessary ^vocations of the day, a

license can cut no figure, and to require one to be taken, unless

for the purpose of taxation, would be wholly inadmissible. It

may be assumed that this statement requires no proof. To sug-

gest the requirement that the farmer or the mechanic shall take

out a license, unless for taxation, is sufficient to put before the

mind the absurdity of any pretence of such authority.

Of monopolies not created by the legislature, the following

may possibly exist:

1. One secured by threats or violence, or other unlawful

means. Temporary control of the labor market is sometimes

secured in this way; but this is of course illegal, and may be

dealt with by the law. The temporary monopoly of the grain
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market of a particular town, accomplished as a means in gam

bling operations, may perhaps be classed under this head, inas-

much as it would be competent to make the means illegal by

statute, if they are not so at the common law.

2. The monopoly which circumstances give to one by reason

of the exceptional location and special advantages of his busi-

ness, or by reason of his having lawfully acquired an exclusive

ownership in something for which there is a public demand.

In this, of course, there is nothing wrongful, nothing illegal.

Does, then, the mere fact that one owns'the whole supply of

any thing, whether it be of a certain kind of property or of a

certain kind of services, confer upon the state the authority to
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interfere and limit the price he may set upon his wares or his

services? To illustrate with a strong instance: Suppose in

some state a single individual should own the only mine in the

country of some metal important for use in the mechanical arts;

would it be competent for the state, on the ground that com-

petition with him was impossible, to restrict at discretion the

price he should be allowed to charge for it? These questions,

it will be perceived, present no problem concerning the author-

ity of the state to appropriate exclusive rights, however ac-

quired, under the eminent domain; they raise only the question

of the right to limit the prices which individuals may charge for

that which is conceded to be their own. Whoever shall under-

take to answer these questions in the affirmative should be ex-

pected to show how the power may be harmonized with the

general principles of free government.

3. The monopolies effected by combination of all who have

the required wares or services for sale is of still a different na-

ture. These exist in every part of the country, and it is gen-

erally assumed that the state is powerless to interfere and break

them up when they limit their action to fixing prices by peace-

able means, and when the business is not one over which the

state may exercise exceptional power. Whatever 'may be

thought of the wisdom or usefulness of trades-unions, the state,

so long as they undertake only to regulate their own charges, is

expected to abstain from interference. Letting others alone,

these unions must be let alone by others. The state cannot say
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that their members shall take less than they will voluntarily

consent to take; neither, on the other hand, can it compel

others to pay more than they will voluntarily consent to pay.

And the principle which must apply to them is general.

4. The case of "virtual" monopolies effected by superior

industry, enterprise, skill, and thrift, it would seem, might be

passed over in silence. When the person who by such means

has secured special advantages has done so without the aid of

any peculiar privileges, and with every other person at liberty

under the law to compete with him, it is a misuse of terms to

call his advantages a monopoly. Moreover, such a person is

under the condemnation neither of the law nor of public sen-
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timent. The qualities he has displayed in achieving his success

are likely to bring him applause rather than censure, and he

could not be put under restraint because of them, except upon

grounds which would authorize the industrious, the enterprising,

and the successful to be held in check whenever it was discovered

that they were outstripping their fellows.

It seems plain, then, that there are limits which the state

cannot overstep in interfering with private business under the

pretence of regulation. The rules by which these limits may

be determined are, from the nature of the case, incapable of

being precisely indicated so as to preclude mistake or contro-

versy, but the following ought to be unquestioned:

1. Whatever in modern times has generally been looked upon

as being outside the sphere of legislation, should be regarded as

finally eliminated from state authority. To do this is only to take

notice of the steady growth of the free principles which have

come from common-law rules and usages, and of their gradual

expansion with the general advance in intelligence and inde-

pendent thought and action among the people. The gradual

transition from despotism to freedom has been mainly accom-

plished by the dropping out one by one of obnoxious and des-

potic powers, and by the recognition of the changes effected as

permanent modifications of the constitutional system. Under

this head may be classed the power in the state to create mo-

nopolies at will. For nearly three hundred years this power

has been generally denied to the state, and to exercise and
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sustain it now is to discard whatever in freedom of industrial

effort and competition has been gained in that period.

2. Wherever an extreme power has been supported by spe-

cial and exceptional reasons, it should be regarded as gone when

the reasons have ceased to exist. Thus, if in the founding of

a colony it should be found necessary to employ the power of

taxation to assist in the establishment and support of mills, yet

as the power is an extreme power and only called into use by

the extremity of the case, the power should be considered re-

called when the necessity has ceased. And when the power to

aid mills by taxation is gone, such exceptional power to regulate

as must have sprung from it should be considered recalled also.
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3. A questionable power, long disused, should be considered

abandoned or recalled. Under this head may be instanced the

power to fix the price of labor. Such a power belongs to bar-

barous and despotic times; it is inconsistent with genuine lib-

erty, and it may be exercised to reduce men to virtual slavery.

In the American States it has not been exercised since they

passed from the colonial condition, and this of itself ought to

be accepted as conclusive against the existence of the power.

The American constitutions, in providing that no man shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,

should be understood as protecting the liberty of employment

with the same jealous care with which they protect against un-

lawful confinement behind bolts and bars.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the rulings of

any court or to enter upon the examination of any decision.

The discussion is upon general principles, and not upon particu-

lar cases. The discussion, however, may justify the cautionary

remark, that it is a very dangerous thing to make by a precedent

an inroad upon one of the fundamental principles of liberty,

because precedents tend to beget a habit of thought and action

which leads insensibly in the direction in which they point.

Every doubtful precedent should therefore be carefully consid-

ered, and never accepted when it will not stand the test of

settled rules of right. It has recently been said in a case in

which a strong exercise of legislative power was under discus-

sion, that the legislature may constitutionally restrict the
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charges which may be made for the use of property, because

profits are not property, and, therefore, constitutional protec-

tion cannot be claimed for them. That is as much as to say,

the constitution protects a man in his property, but not in the

enjoyment of his property; he may have his farm, but the state

may take away his profits by limiting his sales to the cost of

production. A constitutional protection of this sort is a mere

mockery. "The idea of property," says Mr. Bentham, "con-

sists in an established expectation; in the persuasion of power

to derive certain advantages from the object, according to the

nature of the case." It is true that possible future profits are not

property; they cannot be handled or enjoyed, and they may
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never be realized; perhaps if one were wrongfully deprived of

the opportunity to earn them, he might, because of their un-

certainty, not be able to secure suitable redress; but the capa-

bility of property, by means of the labor or expense or both

bestowed upon it. to be made available in producing profits,

is a potential quality in property, and as sacredly protected by

the constitution as the thing itself in which the quality inheres.

He who denies this may on the same grounds say that while

the right to labor is a constitutional right, yet that the profits

of labor before they are realized are under legislative control,

and may be kept down to prevent, as the early Massachusetts

statute had it, " oppression" by " excessive wages."
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